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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses Liam Shields’ sufficientarianism and especially his 
very innovative construction of the Shift Thesis: that above the relevant 
threshold there is a significant change in our reasons to benefit people 
further. The paper argues that, despite its clear advantages, Shields’ view 
still faces some general problems. First, that it says too little about how 
different types of reasons to benefit someone should be weighed against 
each other. Second, and more importantly, that Shields does not provide 
satisfactory reasons for why we need the Shift in the first place. The paper 
argues that given the value assumptions that sufficientarians normally 
adhere to, the upper limit version remains a more promising alternative.         
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Liam Shields’ development of the sufficiency view – the view that justice is 
concerned with securing enough for everyone – is among the most 
promising outlines for a theory of distributive justice in contemporary 
political philosophy. Shields’ rewritings of the sufficiency principle have, 
since their origin in 2012, gained much attention and many philosophers 
and political theorists have found them to improve the general outlook of 
sufficientarianism. Although Shields speaks into a field of great complexity, 
the key contribution is utterly simple. In a nutshell, Shields’ main point of 
argument is that sufficientarianism need not imply that we should ignore 
inequalities once everyone has “enough”. Instead, he argues, sufficiency 
implies merely that there is a significant shift in our reasons to benefit 
people further. This development has now – true to Shields’ own wording 
– become known as “the Shift Thesis” (2016; 2012).
The Shift Thesis effectively offers a very appealing sufficientarian reply 
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to the critics’ concern about how justice applies to situations where 
inequalities persist but where no one is below the threshold. Thus, the 
advantages of Shields’ sufficientarianism are obvious. However, the view is 
not without its limitations. In this paper, I raise some critical questions for 
Shields’ sufficientarianism and I defend the “upper limit” sufficiency view 
as a more promising framework. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 
lays out sufficientarianism generically. Section 2 presents Liam Shields’ 
amendment to this view in the form of his Shift Thesis. Section 3 raises 
some critical questions for Shields’ version of the sufficiency view that I 
believe he needs to answer. Section 4 defends upper limit sufficientarianism 
as a more plausible version of sufficientarianism than Shields’ account. 
Section 5 concludes.
1. SUFFICIENTARIANISM
Sufficientarians care about individual people’s absolute standing. They do 
not care about people’s relative standing unless it affects their absolute 
standing (Axelsen and Nielsen 2015). Here I have no space to unfold this 
idea, but one plausible way to understand it is to say that sufficientarians 
use a threshold constraint to discriminate between relevant and irrelevant 
individual demands of justice (Segall 2016; Hirose 2016)– e.g. similar to 
Scanlon’s objective criterion for distinguishing between urgent and non-
urgent preferences (1975). 
Without distinguishing between different theoretical specifications 
within the sufficientarian literature, we can assume the following generic 
principle (adopted from Nielsen 2017):
The generic sufficiency view
Justice is concerned with eliminating absolute deficiencies rather than 
inequalities
This generic formulation captures the driving moral statement of any 
specified sufficiency view , and although critics are sceptical, many find it 
intuitively plausible.2 
However, despite the merits of the generic view, sufficientarians might 
need to say more about how to set the threshold in order to render the 
sufficiency view theoretically plausible. This is because all sufficiency 
2 See among others Frankfurt (1987), Crisp (2003), Raz (1986: 240); Benbaji (2005) 
Huseby (2010).
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views – including the generic view – imply that there exists, at least in 
theory, a threshold point above which inequalities are irrelevant (or 
significantly less relevant) to justice. Thus, for example, sufficiency views, 
even when very generic, are always vulnerable to objections stressing the 
intuitive dissatisfaction with the implication that above some threshold T, 
the inequality between the super-rich and those who barely have enough 
would not be a concern of justice (Casal 2007). 
But identifying the threshold is a delicate matter, and critics of the 
sufficiency view believe sufficientarians face a theoretical dilemma on 
this issue. If defining a relatively high threshold, such as in terms of welfare 
satisfaction or contentment, the sufficiency view undervalues the urgency 
found in the substance of absolute deficiency. That is, if our sufficiency 
view allows not being perfectly content to be an absolute deficiency, we 
have certainly undervalued the importance of being released of deficiencies 
such as hunger, deprivation, suffering, etc. Any reasonable sufficiency 
view needs to underline the special importance of addressing the latter 
deficiencies rather than the former. On the other hand, setting a very low 
threshold – e.g. set at the level of basic needs fulfilment – makes the 
sufficiency view vulnerable to being ignorant of even quite significant 
inequalities above this threshold. The difference between the super-rich 
and people who barely have their basic needs met is simply not, on any 
reasonable interpretation of justice, irrelevant. Thus, the sufficiency view 
seems faced with this troublesome dilemma in fleshing out a relevant and 
plausible threshold level.
2. SHIELDIAN SUFFICIENTARIANISM 
Liam Shields smoothly solves the above dilemma. He proposes to exchange 
the strong negative thesis with what he calls “the Shift Thesis”, stating that 
“once people have secured enough there is a discontinuity in the rate of 
change of the marginal weight of our reasons to benefit them further” 
(2016: 30). Although this interpretation of the view does not flesh out a 
much specified threshold definition, it does in an important way render 
the sufficiency view more plausible. What it does, effectively, is to resolve 
the dilemma by allowing for a more modest threshold level – set at some 
non-specified level of resources – than would otherwise have been 
acceptable, since the Shift Thesis enables sufficientarianism to object to 
inequalities above the threshold. This softens the hard inegalitarian 
implications of sufficientarianism while still remaining loyal to the central 
driving intuition of the generic sufficiency view.
We can get a better grasp of what the Shift Thesis involves in figure 2.2, 
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which Shields presents to illustrate what he calls non-uniform 
prioritarianism (2016: 32).
Figure 2.2. Non-uniform prioritarianism
Figure 2.2 displays how non-uniform prioritarianism involves a 
significant change in our moral reasons to benefit people further, once 
they reach a certain welfare level (here this level is 2). This captures the 
shift that Shields builds his sufficientarianism upon. Non-uniform 
prioritarianism is different from uniform prioritarianism because the 
former claims that there is a central change in terms of the relationship 
between how well off people are and the moral importance of benefitting 
them. This change, Shields convincingly argues, can only be explained in 
reference to the Shift Thesis. Thus, although non-uniform prioritarians 
can entail a wide range of other distributive principles, they must rely on 
some sufficiency principle, because they appeal to the shift. This 
perspective grounds a much wider relevance of sufficiency principles than 
normally assumed, because it identifies a very intuitively plausible and 
common idea – that there are changes in the rate of reasons to benefit 
people depending on their level of welfare – as a specifically sufficientarian 
idea. And even more importantly, the appeal to the Shift Thesis does take 
much of the edge off the most widely shared criticism of sufficientarianism, 
namely that it is implausible to accept that inequalities above the threshold 
level are irrelevant to justice. Thus, the prospects of grounding the 
sufficiency view upon the synthesis of the Positive Thesis and the Shift 
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Thesis is promising and fully justifies Shields’ status as among the leading 
contributors to the development of sufficientarian theory. 
3. SOME GENERAL PROBLEMS WITH THE SHIFT
Although the advantages of the Shift Thesis are clear enough, there are still 
some questions that need to be addressed. The Shift Thesis is generic and 
ecumenical in its outline, and although this is of course not in itself a 
problem, it blurs our perception of what happens after the shift. Shields 
seems to imply that the Shift Thesis could be compatible with sets of moral 
reasons that refer to the value of fairness above the threshold (2016: 35). 
But this raises the question of what the relationship is between the 
sufficiency-reason and other moral reasons. Shields’ central idea seems to 
be that once our sufficiency-reason – that is, our reason to benefit a person 
that stems from this person being below the absolute threshold-level of 
welfare – stops being salient, because the person is pushed above the 
threshold, we will turn to the best alternative reason to benefit further. 
Fairness concerns, such as distributive egalitarianism or responsibility, 
seem likely candidates. But that gives the impression that the shift is not 
accurately depicted as a bend on the otherwise nicely linear (prioritarian) 
graph of the development of our moral reasoning. Rather, it seems that we 
should think of it as two separate lines. One line, the sufficiency-reason, 
representing our very strong commitment to bring people above the 
threshold, and then a separate line, representing our other moral concerns, 
that so to speak “take over” once we reach the absolute threshold. This is 
shown in figure 2.2* below. 
In figure 2.2*, the shift is depicted as the intersection between the red 
line, representing our sufficiency-reason to benefit people which is based 
on their (below-threshold) level of welfare, and the blue dotted line, which 
represents whatever weaker moral reasons we are left with once the 
stronger moral reasons becomes non-salient. If 2.2* is a fair illustration of 
the shift, and I believe it is actually more precise than Shields’ own from 
figure 2.2, then it raises the question of how these two sets of moral reasons 
relate to each other. In other words, how should we interpret the relationship 
between the two lines in figure 2.2*? 
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Figure 2.2* The Shift Thesis as plural sets of reasoning
It seems then, that to make the Shields framework plausible, one would 
have to decide on a reasonable relationship between the sufficiency-reason 
and other reasons. First, one possibility is to say that the sufficiency-reason 
should only take some priority over other moral concerns, but in general be 
weighed against our alternative set of reasons. That is, if fairness is a 
relevant moral reason, then this reason ought to be given some weight in 
our moral deliberation. That is, our decision to help Person I rather than 
Person II to reach the threshold depends not only on their level of welfare 
but also on the interaction of other moral reasons – say responsibility-
sensitive fairness – on the sufficiency-reason. For example, we might say 
that if Person I and II are faring equally badly (both below threshold at 
level 1,5), but differ in terms of exercise of responsibility, then responsibility 
sensitivity tie-breaks our moral deliberation in favour of priority to the 
prudent. That is, under resource scarcity, we should give priority to helping 
the prudent over helping the imprudent. But then we might also say that 
although being worse off than others below the threshold takes more 
presence in our calculation than responsibility sensitivity, then large 
differences in responsibility could outweigh the priority given from level of 
welfare, so that even if Persons I and II are unequally badly off (e.g. I at 1; II 
at 1,5), then the difference in their exercise of responsibility could be 
significant enough as to alter our immediate priority. Finally, it could also 
very likely imply that under given circumstances, where we have very 
weighty responsibility-sensitive reasons to benefit Person I who is above 
the threshold (e.g. at level 3), these reasons could potentially outweigh our 
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reason to help Person II (et level 1,5) reach the threshold. 
This seems like a possible way to embrace value pluralism much in line 
with standard luck egalitarianism (Temkin 2003; Lippert-Rasmussen 
2016), but it seems a very unlikely sufficientarian strategy. This is because 
it downplays the work of the Positive Thesis (at least in theory) to a 
miniscule degree, although this is so centrally carrying the sufficiency 
intuition. This leaves the Shift Thesis shifty3 because it makes the 
sufficiency-reason – stemming from the strong appeal of the Positive 
Thesis – merely one among a number of moral considerations.
Shields might of course decide that the sufficiency-reason should take 
absolute priority over other moral concerns. This is the standard 
sufficientarian move. And this, I should stress, is what I believe he ought to 
say. But there are two problems involved for Shields in taking this path. 
First, if fairness (or another egalitarian concern) is fully outweighed by the 
sufficiency-reason below the threshold, but takes the lead above the 
threshold, once our sufficiency-reason becomes non-salient, then Shields’ 
sufficientarianism is not distinctive from pluralist telic egalitarianism 
such as Temkin’s comparative fairness egalitarianism (2003; 2017). Shields 
might of course just say that this is because, on his account, Temkin is a 
sufficientarian, but this seems strange because the dispute between 
sufficientarians and egalitarians is not about accurate labelling but about 
the value of distributive equality. Hence, if that is the case, it seems more 
correct to withhold that Shields is no sufficientarian. 
Second, if Shields gives absolute priority to the sufficiency reason, then 
his synthesis of the Positive Thesis with the Shift Thesis makes his view 
vulnerable to the same objection he presents against upper limit 
sufficientarianism, which he contrasts himself to. 
To see how Shields’ view departs from upper limit sufficientarianism let 
me employ an example, also borrowed from Shields (2016: 23).
Table 2.3 Upper limit sufficientarianism 
 I II III IV V VI
A 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 3
B 5 5 5 5 5 5
C 5 5 280 5 5 4
3 I am indebted to Jens Thaysen for this catchy, although admittedly slightly tacky, 
punchline.
 Shielding Sufficientarianism from the Shift 149
LEAP 5 (2017)
Table 2.3 shows three different hypothetical scenarios (A, B, and C) 
entailing very different distributional shares for different groups or persons 
(e.g. in a given society). As Shields rightly points out, upper limit 
sufficientarianism would prefer B to both A and C (which headcount 
sufficientarianism would as well), when the threshold is set at 5. This 
contrasts it with weighted prioritarianism, which would rank the scenarios 
A, C, B (from best to worst). Shields favours the weighted prioritarian reply 
on intuitive grounds, and if this was not the case, it would be unclear on 
what grounds he would dismiss upper limit sufficientarianism in the first 
place. But if the Shift Thesis is to be understood to entail absolute priority 
to our moral reason to benefit people who are below the threshold, then 
Shieldian sufficientarianism – synthesising the Positive Thesis with the 
Shift Thesis – gives the same ranking as upper limit sufficientarianism. 
That is, it would favour B over both A and C, when the threshold is at 5.
This is surely no embarrassment. Maximin and leximin prioritarian 
views would also prefer B over A and C, as would telic egalitarianism. That 
is, on further reflection, it is not at all obvious that our intuitions about this 
case work in favour of weighted prioritarianism or Shields’ own account, 
and against the other theoretical standpoints. In fact, in section 4 defend 
upper limit sufficientarianism against this intuitive strike. My point here 
is merely to highlight that if Shields wishes to stick with the weighted 
prioritarian view in this case – and therefore rank A, C, B (from best to 
worst) – then he is left with giving away the sufficientarian commitment to 
the strong priority of the Positive Thesis.
4. DEFENDING THE UPPER LIMIT
This section defends upper limit sufficientarianism. As suggested in 
section II, the sufficiency view could be understood in a negative form, as 
a generic principle saying that, justice is concerned with eliminating absolute 
deficiencies rather than inequalities. If this principle is accurate, then 
justice would be fulfilled once absolute deficiencies are eliminated, 
regardless of whether inequalities still persist beyond this point. This 
adheres to the ranking B over A and C in table 2.3 (when the threshold is 5), 
because only in B are deficiencies eliminated. As mentioned, this is the 
same guidance as maxmin and leximin prioritarianism as well as 
egalitarianism, so it need not be counterintuitive, but as Shields mentions, 
upper limit sufficientarianism also gives counterintuitive guidance in 
cases where everyone has secured enough (2016: 23). To see this, we can 
take a look at table 2.3*
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Table 2.3 Upper limit sufficientarianism (with no one below the threshold) 
 I II III IV V VI
A 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 5
B 5 5 5 5 5 5
C 5 5 280 5 5 5
Table 2.3* is similar to table 2.3 except that the worse off in A and in C 
are now lifted to the threshold level (at 5). Thus, no one is below the 
threshold level and, moreover, the worst off in A and in C are just as well off 
as the best off in B. In other words, in economic terms, A dominates B and 
C; and C dominates B, so that moving from B to C; and from C to A would 
be Pareto-efficient moves. However, upper limit sufficientarianism would 
be unable to prefer A over B (or C over B), simply because everyone is above 
the threshold, and because upper limit sufficientarianism accepts the 
“upper limit claim” that “no distributive principles apply to benefits among 
those who have secured enough” (2016: 22). It is not that it necessarily 
needs to prefer B, but the problem is that it cannot in itself capture that we 
should not be satisfied with B, although dominantly better alternatives A 
and C exist. This clearly seems to put a stark challenge against upper limit 
sufficientarianism; but one that Shields’ Shift Thesis can enable us to 
tackle.
On my account, there is nothing wrong with the guidance of upper limit 
sufficientarianism even in this extreme scenario. In fact, on further 
reflection it is not even clear that our intuition works to count against it. 
The central problem with the illustration of upper limit sufficientarianism 
above is that it gets lost in what I call the Illusion of Numbers against 
Sufficientarianism.4 The illusion of numbers against sufficientarianism 
assumes that the difference between how well different people are doing is 
meaningfully captured by the numerical distance between larger and 
smaller numbers. But sufficientarianism properly understood should 
reject this assumption. The remainder of this section explains why and 
thereby argues against the illusion of numbers against sufficientarianism.
To see how Shields’ illustration of upper limit sufficientarianism gets 
lost in the illusion of numbers against sufficientarianism, let’s consider the 
content of the example in Table 2.3*; which, you will recall, is a hard case 
against upper limit sufficientarianism. In Table 2.3*, the threshold is set at 
4 I adopt this from Nielsen (unpublished paper).
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welfare level 5. Since the figure “5” alone does not in itself tell us a lot about 
why we choose that level rather than any other as the relevant threshold, 
we assume that it is the content (of resources, opportunities and welfare) 
that this figure stands for that constitutes the relevant cut-off point. 
Following Shields’ example, let’s say that “those who pay the top rate of 
income tax have enough after tax” (2016: 22), and therefore let’s assume 
that these people are at level 5. What that must mean is that they have 
sufficient resources and opportunities for their welfare level to be 
considered a “5”. This seems intuitively appealing. These people have a 
stable monthly income; they lead autonomous lives; they can afford decent 
or very decent housing; they have access to decent social insurance; they 
have a stable health together with a health care system that is prepared to 
assist them if they fall ill; they are also mentally healthy; their offspring 
face good social opportunities and have access to good quality education 
etc. All these things are tacitly put them into the figure “5”.
The problem arises because if all these welfare goods are contained in 
the number “5”, then what can possibly be the content of the number 
“1000”? In instance, it follows that, if the threshold (5) contains all the 
above mentioned welfare goods, then the best-off (at 1000) have all the 
same times two-hundred. Or, more accurately, they would have the welfare 
level that you gain from having all these goods times two-hundred. But 
that is not only hard to grasp, but simply meaningless. You could of course 
imagine a case in which everyone has all the before mentioned welfare 
goods and then still some have 200 times as much money as others, but 
then the inequality in question is solely expressed in material resources, 
and this is useless because “money” alone is very rarely the currency that 
critics of sufficiency would employ. For one thing, it is evident that very 
rich people could be worse off than less rich people in other 
value-metrics. 
The illusion of numbers against sufficientarianism stems from the fact 
that numerical comparisons are simplistically scalar and potentially 
infinite, whereas real life comparisons are not only more complex than 
that, but also simply incompatible with that way of making interpersonal 
comparisons. Upper limit sufficientarians reject the simple numerical 
comparison assumption on which these comparisons are made. They are 
not concerned with numbers. Their only concern is deficiency. They care 
about eliminating material deficiency such as hunger, deprivation, illness, 
suffering etc., and they care about social deficiency such as oppression, 
dominance, discrimination etc. (Frankfurt 1987; Raz 1986). Upper limit 
sufficientarians reject the simple numerical comparison assumption in 
favour of another assumption; namely, that there is an absolute level of well-
being (broadly conceived), above which additional resources will not benefit 
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people further in any way relevant to justice, regardless of the strength of 
people’s personal desire to possess more resources. On that assumption, it 
seems that there is nothing wrong with perceiving B as incomparable with 
A and C.
But from that assumption, we can derive a rather interesting and strong 
claim about the nature of the value of distributive goods, which is 
controversial, but which I think we have good reasons to accept. We can 
say that, no distributive good (or bundle of goods), that is relevant to justice, 
can have a comparable value if given to people below the threshold than if 
given to people above that threshold (Nielsen 2016). This claim is 
incompatible with the simple numerical comparison assumption, because 
it implies that the difference between 996 and 1000 is incomparable to the 
distance between 1 and 5, although these distances are clearly comparable 
in a numerical sense captured by the mathematical fact that 4 equals 4. But 
translated into what these numbers stand for in terms of real goods and 
their value, it is far from implausible to accept it. Four loaves of bread is of 
course equivalent to four loaves of bread, but the value of that bundle of 
goods surely hinges on whether one faces an absolute deficiency in food 
supplies. 
5. CONCLUSION
Liam Shields’ writings have surely had a great impact on the theorizing 
within distributive justice. And although this is only for good reasons, in 
this paper I have argued that his main contribution, consisting in the 
offering of the Shift Thesis as an alternative to the Negative Thesis, is an 
unnecessary detour for sufficientarians. In fact, adopting the Shift 
Thesis needlessly leaves sufficientarianism open to a number of critical 
questions, because the alternative in standing up for upper limit 
sufficientarianism seems much less theoretically troublesome. I 
conclude that where the Shift Thesis leaves sufficientarianism “shifty”, 
the upper limit seems to do good enough for sufficientarianism to 
maintain its strong potential for being the leading ideal of distributive 
justice.
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